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This paper employs a two-period life-cycle model to derive the optimal tax policy
when educational investments are subject to credit constraints. Credit constraints
arise from the limited commitment of debitors to repay loans and are endogenously
determined by private banks under the non-default condition that individuals can-
not be better o® by defaulting. We show that the optimal redistributive taxation
trades the welfare gain of reducing borrowing demand and of changing the credit
constraints against the e±ciency costs of distorting education and labor supply. In
addition, we compare the optimal taxation with that when credit constraints are
taken as given. If income taxation decreases (increases) the borrowing limit, taking
credit constraints as given leads to a too high (low) labor tax rate. Thus, ignoring
the e®ects of tax policy on credit constraints overestimates (underestimates) the
welfare e®ects of income taxation. Numerical examples show that income taxation
tightens the credit constraints and the optimal tax rates are lower when credit con-
strains are endogenized. The intuition is that redistributive taxation reduces the
incentive to invest in education and to work, thus exaggerating the moral hazard
problems associated with credit constraints.
JEL classi¯cation: H21, I2, J2
Keywords: labor taxation, human capital investment, credit constraints
¤I am grateful to Dan Anderberg, S¿ren Bo Nielsen, Dominik Sachs as well as to participants in the
research seminar on public ¯nance at CESifo institute for very valuable comments. Financial support
by the Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.1 Introduction
Redistributive policy and education subsidies are often justi¯ed by the existence of credit
constraints faced by poor individuals when they invest in education. Credit constraints
arise from the limited commitment of debitors to repay loans. In addition, moral hazard
problems due to the non-observability of e®ort in education as well as in labor supply
make human capital bad collateral and thus make the credit for educational investment
more di±cult to access. In the presence of credit constraints, family income would play
an important role in determining educational attainment. Using the changes in income
distribution in the US as instrument, Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) ¯nd that family
income is the main explanation for the di®erent enrollment rates of children from di®erent
income groups. Belley and Lochner (2007) conclude that the importance of income has
substantially increased from the early 1980s to the early 2000s, after comparing the causal
e®ects of income on educational attainment found in the NLSY97 date with those found
in the NLSY79 data. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2008) show further that the increase
in the role of family income can only be explained by more severe credit constraints in
response to increasing income inequality and rising tuition costs. Evidence for credit
constraints is found as well in other empirical studies. Kane (1995) and Van der Klaaum
(2002) identify large impacts of ¯nancial aids and tuition costs on college enrollment,
which indicates the presence of credit constraints. Stinebricker and Stinebricker (2008)
¯nd an important causal role of credit constraints in explaining the drop-out decision of
students from low-income families. Credit constraints are also shown by Kean and Wolpin
(2001) to signi¯cantly a®ect students' consumption and working choices. Kane (1996)
argues that borrowing constraints can explain the higher tendency of delayed entrance in
college observed in high tuition states.
To mitigate the negative e®ects of credit constraints, optimal policy should feature
public provision of education and redistribution from rich to poor individuals (see e.g.
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996, 1998 and Benabou, 1996).
However, these studies take credit constraints as given and ignore the fact that govern-
mental policy can change credit constraints by a®ecting the incentive to repay. Therefore,
optimal policy derived under the assumption of exogenously given credit constraints could
be misleading. Krueger and Perri (1999) show that a more redistributive taxation can
exaggerate credit constraints and leads to a lower welfare. Andolfatto and Gervais (2006)
argue that education subsides and a pension program ¯nanced by taxes on working pop-
ulation may actually lead to a lower level of human capital investment when the e®ects of
taxation on credit constraints are considered. By simulating an educational investment
model with endogenously determined credit constraints, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2002) ¯nd that education subsidies have substantially greater e®ects than implicated in
a similar model with exogenous credit constraints.
2This paper aims to analyze optimal tax policy when individuals face credit constraints
in educational investment, while taking the e®ects of taxation on credit constraints into
account. To that end, we employ a two-period life-cycle model with identical agents, who
invest in education in the ¯rst period and work in the second period. There are private
banks providing loans for the individuals. We assume that in case of default banks can
force the debitor to pay back the loans if the repayment is covered by the collateral,
which is a given fraction of the debitor's earnings. Otherwise, banks can only seize that
part of the earnings. Moreover, the debitor has to pay a ¯xed cost associated with the
enforcement of repaying. We make the further assumption that educational investment
is not veri¯able. Educational investment in this paper is mainly secondary and higher
education. The costs of education include tuition fees, expenditure for computer and
books etc, additional costs for accommodation and forgone earnings. These costs are
hardly veri¯able except for tuition fees, which are only a small share of the total costs.1
Labor supply in the second period is not observable either. The non-observability of
education and labor supply leads to the moral hazard problems that the collateral, i.e.
the debitor's seizable income, is unknown when credit is extended. To avoid defaults,
banks would limit the amount of credit the individuals can take. Under the assumption
of a perfectly competitive loan market the equilibrium borrowing limit is determined by
the condition that the individuals are indi®erent between repaying and defaulting.
We show that, when credit constraints are binding, both educational investment and
the ¯rst period consumption are too low compared to those without credit constraints.
When government has access to age-speci¯c transfers, the optimal policy is to transfer
income from the second to the ¯rst period via lump-sum transfers, which is in fact
governmental loans. When age-speci¯c transfers are not available, government has to
use distortionary labor tax to alleviate credit constraints. We derive the optimal linear
labor tax rate, which trades the welfare e®ects of redistributing income across the life-cycle
periods and the welfare e®ects of changing the borrowing limit against the e±ciency costs
of distorting education and labor supply. Compared to the case where credit constraints
are taken as given, the optimal labor tax rate is lower (higher) if redistributive taxation
tightens (relaxes) the borrowing limit. Numerical examples show that for reasonable
model parameters the borrowing limit decreases with labor tax rate; and ignoring the
e®ects of tax policy on credit constraints overestimates the welfare e®ects of taxation.
The intuition is that individuals planning to default invest less in education and work less
in order to reduce default costs. Redistributive taxation reduces the incentive to invest
in education and to work, thus exaggerating the moral hazard problems associated with
credit constraints.
1Becker (1964) and Boskin (1975) show that the costs of goods investment and time investment (which
is the forgone earnings) in the total costs of education is one-quarter and three-quarters. The share of
tuition costs in total costs are thus less than one-quarter.
3This paper is closely related to Jacobs and Yang (2010), who analyze the optimal
taxation under exogenous credit constraints. They show that a redistributive taxation
mitigates credit constraints by redistributing from high-income to low-income (and con-
strained) life-cycle periods. In this paper we endogenize credit constraints and show how
this a®ects the optimal tax policy. Close to our analysis is also Andolfatto and Gervais
(2006), who also analyze the optimal tax policy under endogenous credit constraints.
However, they only analyze the optimal age-speci¯c lump-sum transfers and argue that
it is optimal to redistribute from young and old to working individuals. In our model
it would imply redistributing from working to young individuals. The completely oppo-
site results of our paper arise from the di®erent assumptions about default punishment.
They assume that defaulting debitors are punished by being excluded from capital mar-
ket. Consequently, redistributing income from old to working individuals relaxes credit
constraints by increasing default costs, namely the costs of no-saving for old age. Di®er-
ently, we assume that creditors can seize part of the debitors' earnings. Redistributing
from working to young individuals via lump-sum transfers increases the costs of losing
part of the earnings and relaxes credit constraints.
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002) show that education subsidies relax credit con-
straints and have greater impact on human capital formation than in a similar model
with exogenous credit constraints. Intuitively, education subsidies increase educational
investment and thus future earnings. Default becomes less attractive since default costs,
i.e., losing part of the earnings, increase. Their analysis assumes exogenous labor supply
and the veri¯ability of educational investment. As a result, the amount that the creditors
can seize in case of default is known when credit is extended. In this paper, however, the
non-observability of educational investment and labor supply leads to moral hazard prob-
lems, which are the main reason why human capital is badly collateralizable. Krueger
and Perri (1999) analyze quantitatively the e®ects of tax system on welfare with credit
constraints. They show that, under plausible conditions, the increase of tax progressivity
leads to a lower welfare by exaggerating credit constraints. Thus, our results seem to
be consistent with their ¯ndings. However, they did not consider educational investment
and labor supply decision.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the model
environment and derive the borrowing constraints under non-default condition. Section
3 analyzes the optimal tax policy for both the case of age-speci¯c lump-sum transfers
and the case of uniform transfers. Numerical examples are given in section 4. The last
section concludes.
42 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical individuals whose mass is normal-
ized to one. The individuals live for two periods. In the ¯rst period the representative
individual does not work, but invests in education and consumes. Since we are interested
in credit constraints, we assume that the individual does not have su±cient initial wealth
to ¯nance its optimal educational investment and consumption in the ¯rst period. With-
out loss of generality, we set the initial wealth to zero. After acquiring human capital,
the agent supplies labor in the second period and consumes all its wealth. There are
private banks providing loans for individuals on a perfectly competitive capital market.
The economy is a small open economy, which implies that banks can raise funds at a
constant interest rate r.
2.1 Preferences and human capital technology









¡ ¯v (l), (1)
with c1 and c2 denoting consumption in the ¯rst and the second period respectively and l
the labor supply in the second period. The separability is assumed for reason of simplicity
and does not a®ect the main results of the paper. ¯ is the time preference. The subutility
function u(:) is assumed to be increasing and concave, whilst the disutility function v (:)
is increasing and convex. Furthermore, the Inada-conditions are ful¯lled to avoid corner
solutions.
When the agent is young, it decides on consumption c1, investment in human capital
e and the required borrowing a. The interest rate the agent pays is also r. The costs of
human capital investment e are assumed to be only monetary and may include tuition
fees, forgone earnings and additional costs for computer, accommodation and books etc.
than what would otherwise occur. We assume that these costs are private information,
since additional costs for computer, accommodation and books etc. and forgone earnings
are badly veri¯able. Although tuition fees are observable, the share of tuition fees in the
total costs of education is almost zero for public secondary school and small for higher
education. In the second period the agent becomes adult and supplies labor according
to the wage rate w(e) with w0 (e) > 0 and w00 (e) < 0. Inada-conditions for w(e) are
ful¯lled as well.
The tax system consists of a labor tax with the °at rate t and lump-sum transfers in
both periods, g1 and g2, where the superscript denotes the periods. The agent's budget
5constraints for both periods are consequently
c




2 = (1 ¡ t)w(e)l ¡ (1 + r)a + g
2. (3)
Following standard literature in optimal taxation, only gross income is observable. Since
educational investment is private information, neither wage rate w(e) nor labor supply l
can be veri¯ed.
2.2 First-best allocation
For comparison we ¯rst describe the optimal allocation with a perfect capital market. The
representative agent maximizes utility (1) subject to (2) and (3). As a result, consumption
is smoothed according to the Euler's equation
u1
¯u2 = 1 + r, where u1 and u2 denote the
derivative of the ¯rst and the second period utility of consumption respectively. Moreover,
the agent equals the marginal costs of education to its marginal return, (1 ¡ t)w0 (e)l =
1 + r, and the optimal labor supply is given by (1 ¡ t)w(e) = v0 (l).
Labor taxation distorts educational investment as well as labor supply. Since we have
identical agents and thus no distributional concern, there is no need for governmental
intervention. First-best allocation could be achieved by setting labor tax rate to zero and
using lump-sum taxes to raise exogenous governmental expenditure.
2.3 Endogenous credit constraint
Credit constraints arise from the agent's limited ability to commit itself to the repayment.
We assume that a given fraction ° of the agent's future earnings is taken as collateral.
If the agent defaults, banks can get the repayment (1 + r)a back if it is covered by the
collateral. Otherwise, banks can only get that part of the earnings. Furthermore, the
defaulting agent has to pay a ¯xed cost of F, which covers the banks' costs in processing






(1 + r)a + F if (1 + r)a · °(1 ¡ t)w(e)l,
°(1 ¡ t)w(e)l + F if (1 + r)a > °(1 ¡ t)w(e)l.
We assume that banks cannot seize lump-sum transfer the agent receives in the second
period, which can be thought of as public goods and social insurance that cannot be seized.
Punishment of exclusion from credit markets as in Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2000) and
Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) is not considered in our two-period model.
6An agent would default if the utility of defaulting is higher than that of repaying.
Unlike in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002, 2008), educational investment and labor
supply in our model are private information that cannot be observed by banks. As a
result, the amount of collateral, i.e. the fraction ° of the agent's future earnings, is
unknown when credit is extended to the agent in the ¯rst period. The agent who plans
to default can reduce default costs by reducing educational investment and labor supply.
The non-default condition is thus that the agent cannot be better o® by defaulting and
by adjusting its choices correspondingly. Because the credit market is per assumption
perfectly competitive, the equilibrium borrowing limit would be such that the agent is
indi®erent between repaying and defaulting.
Now we ¯rst derive the indirect utility of the agent when it plans to repay. After
inserting budget constraints (2) and (3) in the utility function (1), the lagrangian function




L = u(¡e + g
1 + a) + ¯u
¡
(1 ¡ t)w(e)l ¡ (1 + r)a + g
2¢
¡ ¯v (l) + ¹(a ¡ a), (4)
where ¹ is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for the credit constraint a · a. ¹ gives the shadow
price of relaxing credit limit by one unit. We assume that the agent is credit constrained,
since the case of slack credit constraint is not interesting. This assumption implies that
a = a; ¹ = u1 ¡ ¯(1 + r)u2 > 0, (5)
u1
¯u2
= (1 ¡ t)w
0 (e)l > 1 + r, (6)
v0 (l)
u2
= (1 ¡ t)w(e). (7)
A credit constrained agent cannot borrow the unconstrained optimal amount of credit
to ¯nance its consumption and educational investment. As a result, both ¯rst period
consumption and educational investment are distorted downwards compared to the ¯rst-
best allocatio_ n:
u1
¯u2 > 1+r and (1¡t)w0 (e)l > 1+r. The agent would like to consume
more and invest more in education if it could borrow more than a.
Binding credit constraints act like an implicit tax on borrowing and educational in-
vestment. We de¯ne this implicit tax as




Accordingly, we can rewrite the ¯rst-order-condition for educational investment as
(1 ¡ ¼)(1 ¡ t)w
0 (e)l = 1 + r. (9)
7Therefore, ¼ measures the extent to which the inter-temporal consumption and educa-
tional investment are distorted by credit constraints. The lower the credit limit a, the
higher is the implicit tax ¼ and the more severe are the credit constraints. Substituting
the optimal decisions given by the ¯rst-order-conditions into the utility function (1), we
can denote the indirect utility of the repaying agent as a function of tax policy, interest
rate and credit limit, V (t;g1;g2;r;a).










(1 ¡ t)w(e)l ¡ min[(1 + r)a;° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l] ¡ F + g
2¢
¡ ¯v (l) + ¹(a ¡ a). (10)
It follows immediately that defaulting always leads to a lower utility if (1 + r)a ·
° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l, since in this case defaulting only causes the additional cost of F and
brings no bene¯t. Consequently, credit constraints can only arise where (1 + r)a >
° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l. Therefore, we derive the ¯rst-order-conditions only for the case (1 + r)a >
° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l.
Since the agent does not repay the loans in the second period, it would borrow as
much as possible, i.e. ad = a. We use the subscript d to denote the variables in case of
default. The ¯rst-order-conditions for the defaulting agent are
ad = a; ¹d = u1d > 0, (11)
u1d
¯u2d




= (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)w(ed). (13)
We can see that the defaulting agent would choose education and labor supply di®er-
ently than the agent who repays. Again, the indirect utility of the defaulting agent can
be denoted as a function of tax policy, interest rate, credit limit and the punishment
parameters, Vd (t;°;F;g1;g2;r;a).
For both maximization problems (4) and (10) the second-order-conditions require that
the marginal utility of consumption should decrease su±ciently fast, the productivity of
education in wage rate is not too high and the marginal disutility of labor should increase
fast enough (see Appendix A.1). These conditions ensure that the positive feedback
between education and labor supply is not too strong such that interior solutions are
obtained. We assume that the second-order-conditions are always ful¯lled.
We denote the optimal borrowing of the repaying agent with a perfect capital market














8which implies that the agent would default if it can borrow a¤. Consequently, no banks
would lend the amount a¤, since they know for sure that the agent would default. This
assumption ensures the existence of credit constraints.
The indirect utility Vd is increasing and concave in borrowing limit a, since
@Vd
@a =
¹d = u1d applies and the ¯rst period consumption always increases with borrowing limit.
The indirect utility V is increasing and concave in a as well, as long as a < a¤. This
is because @V
@a = ¹ = u1 ¡ (1 + r)¯u2 is positive and decreasing in a for a < a¤ and
equal to zero for a ¸ a¤. From the concavity of both V and Vd in a for a < a¤, the
fact that V (t;g1;g2;r;a) > Vd (t;°;F;g1;g2;r;a) for very small a and the assumption
(14), we can conclude that in a (a;V ) diagram Vd would cut V only once from below
in the interval [0;a¤]. Note that for small loans where (1 + r)a · ° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l, the
¯rst-order-conditions for the optimal choices of the defaulting agent are the same as for
the repaying agent and Vd is always lower than V .














Solving the equation (15), we can denote the equilibrium credit limit as the function
A(t;g1;g2;r;°;F). By construction we have A < a¤. In equilibrium, banks would lend
up to the amount of A. The borrowers would take the highest possible loan A and pay
it back in the second period. If the agent borrows more than A, it would default.
Since both the marginal return to education and the net wage rate are lower for the
defaulting agent, it is optimal to invest less in education and to work less if the agent
plans to default. The following lemma compares the optimal choices in equilibrium by
the agent if it plans to default and if it plans to repay.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium the agent who plans to default invests less in educa-
tion and works less than the agent who plans to repay (e > ed and l > ld). It follows
straightforward from the ¯rst period budget constraint (2) and the condition for equilib-
rium V = Vd that c1 < c1
d and c2 > c2
d.
Proof see Appendix A.2.
The comparative statics of the credit limit A depend on how the change in one param-
eter a®ects the indirect utility of repaying agents compared to that of defaulting agents.
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u1 ¡ (1 + r)¯u2 ¡ u1d
< 0 (21)
Using Lemma 1 all of the comparative statics can be signed except for the labor tax
rate. From c1 < c1
d we have u1 > u1d. Moreover, we have u1¡(1 + r)¯u2¡u1d = ¹¡¹d <
0, since the shadow price for a marginal increase of borrowing limit in equilibrium is higher
for the defaulting agent than for the repaying one.2 Therefore, @A
@g1 > 0 and the borrowing
limit increases with g1, ceteris paribus. Intuitively, since the repaying agent consumes
less in the ¯rst period, increasing ¯rst period consumption bene¯ts the repaying agent
more than the defaulting one. On the other hand, increasing the second period transfer
g2 tightens the incentive constraint of repaying and lowers the borrowing limit. This is
because lump-sum transfer is not seizable and it makes the punishment of losing part of
the earnings less severe. A higher interest rate tightens the incentive constraint as well.
The higher the interest rate, the higher the costs of repaying and the more attractive is
defaulting. Making the default punishment more severe, either by increasing the ¯xed
cost F or the fraction of income that can be seized °, increases the default costs and
therefore also the borrowing limit.
However, the e®ect of a higher t is ambiguous. On the one hand, a higher tax rate
harms the defaulting agent more by reducing the second period income, since the de-
faulting agent consumes less in the second period and has a higher marginal utility of
consumption. On the other hand, a higher tax rate reduces the after tax seizable income
and makes the punishment less severe. The total impact of a higher tax rate depends
therefore on which e®ect dominates.
2In equilibrium the agent is indi®erent between repaying and defaulting, V = Vd. If the agent can
borrow one unit more than the equilibrium borrowing limit, it would default, V < Vd. Consequently, we
have ¹ < ¹d.
103 Optimal Tax Policy
In this section we ¯rst formulate the governmental problem and then derive the optimal
tax policy. The government is benevolent and can fully commit to announced tax policy.
The tax system consists of a °at labor tax and lump-sum transfers in both periods. The
time structure of the model is as follows: the government ¯rst announces labor tax and
lump-sum transfers. Then private banks determine the borrowing limit under the non-
default condition (15). After observing tax policy and borrowing constraints, individuals
decide on educational investment, borrowing and labor supply.
We assume without loss of generality that there is no exogenous governmental expen-
diture3. The governmental budget constraint is thus given by
tw(e)l = (1 + r)g
1 + g
2: (22)
The government chooses g1, g2 and t to maximize the indirect utility of a representa-
tive agent, whereby taking the responses of banks in determining credit constraints into
account. The lagrangian function for the governmental problem is
W =V + ´
¡




where the lagrangian multiplier ´ measures the shadow price of governmental revenue.
3.1 Optimal age-speci¯c transfers
We ¯rst derive the optimal tax policy when the government can use age-speci¯c transfers.
With exogenous credit constraints, Jacobs and Yang (2010) argue that the availability of
age-speci¯c transfers enables the government to remove credit constraints perfectly. The
government only has to provide the amount of credit that individuals could not borrow
on the private loan market and requires them to pay it back plus interest in forms of
lump-sum taxes. In fact, government acts through age-speci¯c lump-sum transfers as a
lender to replace the missing (or imperfect) private credit market. As a result, agents are
not credit constrained anymore and the optimal labor tax rate is zero.
In our model with endogenous credit constraints, however, such age-speci¯c transfers
would change the individuals' incentive to repay and thus a®ect the borrowing limit. As
shown before, a higher ¯rst period transfer increases the borrowing limit whilst a higher
second period transfer reduces the borrowing limit. Consequently, age-speci¯c transfers
that redistribute income from the second to the ¯rst period (g1 = ¡(1 + r)g2 > 0)
would increase borrowing limit. The lowest level of lump-sum transfers needed to remove
3Any exogenous governmental expenditure can be ¯nanced by lump-sum taxes in such a way that
credit constraint is not a®ected.








where aLP is the optimal borrowing in a laissez-faire economy with a perfect credit market.
The government should provide the amount of credit to young agents such that the credit
constraints are not binding any more. If government transfers more resources than g1¤,
banks would like to lend more than agents want to borrow. The public lending crowds
out private lending. For g1 = aLP there would be no private lending any more. Compared
to the case of exogenous credit constraints, a lower level of lump-sum transfers is needed
to remove credit constraints perfectly.
Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) also analyze the optimal age-speci¯c lump-sum trans-
fers with endogenous credit constraints. However, they argue that the optimal policy
should be transferring income from young and old to working agents. The di®erence of
our results to theirs arises from the di®erent assumptions about the default punishment.
In their model default is punished by being excluded from the capital market, which
means that agents cannot save any more for old age if they default. Transferring income
from old and young to middle-aged agents makes the costs of no-saving higher and relaxes
the incentive constraint of repaying thereafter. In our two-period model, however, the
punishment of exclusion from capital market is not encompassed. The defaulting agent
is punished by losing part of its labor income. Transferring income from adults to young
agents not only reduces the credit demand but also relaxes the incentive constraint, since
the defaulting agent bene¯ts less from the (mandatory) public lending on which it cannot
default.
The ¯rst-best result with age-speci¯c transfers arises from the assumption that the
government has higher enforcement power than private banks and the agent cannot de-
fault on governmental loans. This assumption is not very harmful since the government
does have higher enforcement power through the tax system. In addition, government
faces lower costs of collecting repayment and a less severe tracking problem than private
banks.
3.2 Optimal tax policy with uniform lump-sum transfers
Age-speci¯c lump-sum transfers (or taxes) are normally di±cult to implement in an
overlapping-generation world due to age-discrimination, which is legally forbidden in
some countries. Therefore, in this section, we analyze the optimal tax policy when age-
speci¯c lump-sum transfers are not available, i.e. g1 = g2 ´ g. The lagrangian function
for governmental optimization becomes
W =V + ´ (tw(e)l ¡ (2 + r)g). (25)
12If credit constraints are exogenous, a redistributive taxation, i.e. a positive tax rate
on labor income and positive lump-sum transfers, alleviates credit constraints by re-
distributing income from high-income to low-income (and constrained) period. In fact,
government still acts like a lender through redistributive taxation to supplement the im-
perfect capital market (see Jacobs and Yang, 2010). With endogenous credit constraints,
there is an additional e®ect of tax policy, namely its e®ect on the borrowing limit, that
has to be taken into account when designing the optimal policy.
Analogously to the de¯nition of the net social marginal valuation of income by Di-
amond (1975) we de¯ne the net social marginal valuation of a higher borrowing limit
as
Ã ´










Ã gives the welfare e®ects, measured in terms of governmental revenue, of a marginal
increase in A. The increase of borrowing limit by one unit increases the utility of the
agents by u1 ¡ (1 + r)¯u2, which is positive for constrained agents. The last two terms
on the right-hand-side of (26) are the e®ects on tax revenue of a higher borrowing limit
due to the induced changes in the agents' choices. A higher A enables the agents to
invest more in education and leads to a higher labor supply due to the positive feedback
between education and labor4. The income e®ects are thus positive as well.














= 2 + r. (27)
The left-hand-side of equation (27) gives the net social marginal valuation of one unit of
income given in both periods, including the income e®ects on tax revenue. The welfare
e®ects of income by a®ecting borrowing limit A is given by Ã @A
@g . If a higher income
increases the borrowing limit, one unit of income is more valuable than that in case of
exogenous credit constraints; and vice versa. In optimum, lump-sum transfers equal the
net social marginal valuation of income to its resource costs, 2 + r, both measured in
terms of the second period income.
The ¯rst-order-condition for the optimal tax rate t can be reformulated as (see Ap-
pendix A.4)














(µ"e + "l), (28)
where "e ´ ¡@ec
@t
1¡t
e and "l ´ ¡@lc
@t
1¡t
l are the compensated tax elasticities of education
and labor supply, z ´ w(e)l denotes the gross labor income, and ½ ´ 1¡¼
2+r¡¼. The optimal
income taxation balances the welfare gain of alleviating credit constraints against the
4Labor supply increases with education as long as the substitution e®ect dominates the income e®ect.
13e±ciency costs of doing so. The latter, as given by the right-hand-side of equation (28),
arises from tax distortions in education and labor supply, measured by the compensated
tax elasticities. µ ´
w0(e)e
w(e) is the elasticity of gross wage rate w.r.t education. The more
important education is, the higher is µ and the higher are the e±ciency costs of tax
distortion.
The welfare gain of taxing labor income is given by the left-hand-side of equation
(28). The ¯rst term is the welfare e®ects for ¯xed borrowing constraints. Taxing labor
income and reimbursing tax revenue in forms of lump-sum transfers redistributes income
from the second to the ¯rst period and thus reduces the credit demand. Since credit
constrained agents value the ¯rst period income more than the second period income
(u1 ¡ ¯(1 + r)u2 > 0), such redistribution increases welfare. The more agents are credit
constrained, as shown by a higher value of ¼, the higher is the welfare gain of transferring
one unit of income from the second to the ¯rst period.
However, since the same amount of transfer has to be given in the second period as




1¡¼+1 < 1 gives the increase in the uniform transfers if tax revenue is
increased by one unit, while taking into account that the relative shadow price of the
¯rst period income compared to the second period is 1+r
1¡¼. Note that for one unit of tax
revenue we have 1+r
1¡¼½ + ½ = 1, i.e., the values of the ¯rst and the second period transfer
should sum up to 1. Consequently, 1¡½ = 1+r
1¡¼½ gives the value of the ¯rst period transfer.
The higher the shadow price 1+r
1¡¼, the higher the value of the ¯rst period transfer and
the higher is the welfare gain of taxation. A higher interest rate and more severe credit
constraints increase the value of the ¯rst period transfer and thus the welfare gain of
taxation.
The second term on the left-hand-side of (28) is the welfare e®ects of taxation by
a®ecting the borrowing constraints. As de¯ned by (26), Ã gives the welfare e®ects of








gives the total change
in borrowing limit for one unit increase in tax revenue. ½ is by de¯nition the increase in
g, while taking the relative price of the ¯rst period income into account. Therefore, ½@A
@g
gives the change in A due to higher lump-sum transfers when tax revenue is increased by
one unit. Similarly, @A
@t
1
z is the change in A due to a higher labor tax rate, whilst 1
z is the
required increase in tax rate to increase the tax revenue by one unit, ceteris paribus.
To sum up, the welfare e®ects of taxing labor income are the sum of the welfare gain
of reducing borrowing demand while keeping the borrowing limit as given and the welfare
e®ect of changing the borrowing limit. The aforementioned comparative statics (equation
(16) to (18)) show that both labor tax t and uniform lump-sum transfer g have ambiguous
e®ect on borrowing limit5. Therefore, the second welfare e®ect can be either positive or




















The optimal tax rate depends on the total welfare gain of alleviating credit constraints
and its e±ciency costs. The higher the total welfare gain and the lower the tax distortions,
the higher is the optimal tax rate.









@t = 0 for exogenous credit constraints. This result is the same as that
in Jacobs and Yang (2010) for identical agents, where exogenous credit constraints are
assumed. Compared to equation (30), the optimal tax rate with endogenous credit con-








Ã, which is the welfare e®ect





z < 0, a more redistributive taxation tightens the credit constraints.
We know from Lemma 1 that the agent who plans to default invests less in education
and works less in order to reduce default costs. Since redistributive taxation reduces the
incentive to invest in education and to work, it exaggerates the moral hazard problems as-
sociated with credit constraints. As a result, the borrowing limit decreases when taxation
becomes more redistributive. Therefore, redistributive taxation has two opposite e®ects
on welfare. It increases welfare by mimicking governmental loans, but reduces welfare
by exacerbating the credit constraints. Compared to the case of exogenous credit con-
straints, the optimal tax rate is lower. Moreover, it can even turn negative, if the negative
e®ect of redistributive taxation by reducing borrowing limit dominates its positive e®ect.
In this case, the optimal taxation is reverse redistributive, i.e. the tax system consists
of lump-sum taxes and labor income subsidies, which redistributes from the ¯rst to the
second period. Such a taxation would increase welfare, because the tax-induced increase





z > 0, a more redistributive taxation not only reduces credit demand
but also relaxes the borrowing limit. Redistributive taxation is therefore more e±cient
in mitigating credit constraints compared to the case of exogenous credit constraints.
Consequently, a higher labor tax rate is optimal.
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002) show that subsidizing education reduces the in-
centive to default and thus has a larger welfare e®ect than in a similar model with exoge-
nous credit constraints. In this paper, we rule out education subsidies by the assumption
15of unobservable educational investment. Since education subsidies mimic age-speci¯c
transfers, the availability of education subsidies would reduce the desirability of labor
taxation. However, as long as the share of observable educational costs in total costs is
not very high, the e®ects of education subsidies are limited. Moreover, subsidizing veri¯-
able costs would distort the e±cient composition of the veri¯able and the non-veri¯able
investment (see Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
We summarize our results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The optimal labor tax rate balances the welfare gain of redistributing
income across periods and of changing the borrowing limit against the e±ciency costs
of distorting educational investment and labor supply. If a higher tax rate and higher
lump-sum transfers tighten (relax) borrowing constraints, the optimal income taxation is
less (more) redistributive compared to the case of exogenous credit constraints.
4 Numerical Examples
This section uses numerical examples to illustrate how borrowing limit responds to chang-
ing tax policy and changing parameters. Moreover, we compare the optimal tax rates
with those under exogenous credit constraints. We should note that these numerical
examples are only for the purpose of illustration. Political interpretation of the results
should be taken with caution.
Following Saez (2001) we assume the utility function to be logarithmic:
U = lnc
1 + ¯ lnc







where " is a parameter governing the (un)compensated elasticity of labor. Furthermore,
we assume the wage rate function to be Cobb-Douglas:
w(e) = ne
µ. (32)
µ is the elasticity of wage rate w.r.t education and n re°ects the individual innate ability
in generating income.
For the parameterization of the benchmark case we set the elasticity of wage rate µ
to 0.5. Trostel (1993) uses the value of 0.45 for the elasticity of human capital in time
investment and the value of 0.15 for the elasticity in goods investment. Jacobs (2005)
uses the values of 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. Therefore the total share of education in the
wage rate of 0.5 lies between the value of 0.4 by Jacobs (2005) and 0.6 by Trostel (1993).
For the parameter ² we take the value of 0.2 as benchmark case. Saez (2001) uses the
value of 0.25 and 0.5 to match the empirical estimates of compensated tax elasticity of
16earnings. With endogenous education in our model, the tax elasticity of earnings is higher
than the value of ². Moreover, we set the interest rate r to 0.63, which equals an annual
interest rate of 5% for a period of 10 years. The time preference ¯ is assumed to be 0.62
such that ¯ (1 + r) ¼ 1. For the punishment parament ° we use the value of 0.2, which
is a bit higher than the calibrated value of 13% by Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002)
for the US economy. The ¯xed cost F, ability n and initial wealth ! are calibrated to
ensure the existence of credit constraints and to avoid corner solutions. We use for the
benchmark case F = 1, n = 6 and ! = 5.
The procedure to ¯nd the borrowing limit is as follows: we ¯rst calculate the optimal
individual borrowing when capital market is perfect. Then we check if the agent can be
better o® by defaulting when the credit limit is at the level of the optimal borrowing.
If this is the case, we reduce the credit limit by one unit and check again if the agent
can be better o® by defaulting. We keep doing this till the agent cannot be better
o® by defaulting. The corresponding credit limit is then the endogenous credit limit.
To ¯nd the optimal tax rate we follow the method used by Jacobs (2005). For each
given tax rate we ¯nd the uniform lump-sum transfer which maximizes the utility of
the representative agent under the governmental budget constraint, whereby the credit
constraints are endogenously determined by the respective tax policy. We then search for
the tax rate that leads to the highest utility of the agent. For comparison we also calculate
the optimal tax rate when credit limit is held constant. The exogenous credit limit is
set to equal the credit limit in laissez-faire. To reduce computational time, we searched
for the optimal tax rate in the range between 0 and 0.5 for the case of exogenous credit
constraints and searched in the range between -0.2 and 0.4 for the case of endogenous
credit constraints6.
We ¯rst depict in Figure 1 the borrowing limit for each given tax rate in benchmark
case, where lump-sum transfer g is chosen optimally. The credit limit falls almost mono-
tonically with increasing tax rate, implying that for our benchmark case labor taxation
tightens the credit constraints.
6For the case of exogenous credit constraints the governmental maximization problem is well-behaved.
We found that for our simulations the optimal tax rates always lie between 0 and 0.5. With endogenous
credit constraints, the indirect utility is almost concave in tax rate and there are only very small local
°uctuations. We also found that the global maximum always lies between -0.2 and 0.4. The Gauss-
programmes for simulation are available upon request.
17Figure 1: Endogenous borrowing limit
For the benchmark case, the optimal tax rates and the corresponding allocations under
endogenous and exogenous credit constraints and in laissez-faire are shown in Table 1.
The credit limit is decreased by optimal taxation compared to laissez-faire. However,
the distortion caused by credit constraints, which is measured by ¼, is reduced. This
is because labor taxation redistributes income to constrained life-cycle period and thus
mitigates the distorting e®ects of credit constraints. Compared to the case of exogenous
credit constraints, the optimal tax rate is lower due to the negative e®ect of labor taxation
on the credit constraints. Moreover, the equilibrium education, labor supply and welfare
are lower when credit constraints are endogenized7. This implies that assuming exogenous
credit constraints overestimates the welfare e®ects of taxation.
t g e l A ¼ v
Endogenous 0:22 0:778 2:047 1:084 1:442 0:08 2:5727
Exogenous 0:25 0:930 2:223 1:093 1:686 0:01 2:5886
Lassez-faire 0 0 2:032 1:107 1:686 0:30 2:5530
Table 1: Benchmark case simulation, n=6, "=0:2, µ=0:5, °=0:2, F=1
Table 2 shows the comparative statics of the borrowing limit. Starting from laissez-
faire and from the benchmark case values, the row dA=dx gives the relative change in
credit limit for given changes in tax policy or in parameters. Ceteris paribus, increasing
the labor tax rate by 1 unit lowers the credit limit by 1:78 unit. However, increasing
the lump-sum transfer by 1 unit relaxes the credit limit by 3:78 unit. Consistent to the
comparative statics derived in (19) to (21), a higher ° and a higher F increase the credit
limit, whereby increasing ° has a much larger e®ect than increasing F. A higher interest
rate r tightens the credit constraints.
dt = 0:01 dg = 0:01 d° = 0:01 dF = 0:1 dr = 0:01
dA=dx ¡1:78 3:74 10 1 ¡1:38
Table 2: Comparative statics
We further simulated the optimal tax rates under exogenous and endogenous credit
7As Saez (2001) pointed out, l does not necessarily represent the working time.
18constraints for di®erent values of the parameters ², ° and µ. The results are reported in
Table 3, 4 and 5 respectively, where the second row gives the optimal tax rates and the
third row gives the corresponding utility. The ¯gures in the bracket are values for the
case of exogenous credit constraints. For all parameter values the endogeneity of credit
constraints reduces the optimal tax rate and the maximized welfare. This suggests that
redistributive taxation has a negative e®ect on the borrowing limit. However, for lower
parameter values the optimal tax rates are reduced only to a small degree. When the
parameter values are higher, the e®ect of the endogeneity of credit constraints tends to
increase.
We ¯rst look at Table 3. Since ² measures the wage rate elasticity of labor supply,
it re°ects the magnitude of the positive feedback e®ect between labor and education.
A higher ² implies that the agent would like to invest more in education and to work
more. Consequently, credit constraints are more severe. This can be seen by the fact
that the optimal tax rate under exogenous credit constraints increases with ², since a
higher tax rate is then needed to alleviate the more severe credit constraints. However,
a higher ² implies that the agent responds more elastically to the changing credit limit.
The negative welfare e®ects of taxation by reducing credit limit are consequently larger.
As a result, the endogeneity of credit constraints lowers the optimal tax rate to a larger
degree.
² = 0:1 ² = 0:15 ² = 0:2 ² = 0:25
t 0:2 (0:22) 0:23 (0:24) 0:22 (0:25) 0:22 (0:27)
v 2:5963 (2:6061) 2:5829 (2:5962) 2:5727 (2:5886) 2:5671 (2:5871)
Table 3: optimal tax rates for di®erent values of "
Increasing the value of ° reduces the optimal tax rates both in case of endogenous
and exogenous credit constraints. A higher value of ° implies higher borrowing limit
and less severe credit constraints, since defaulting is less attractive due to higher default
costs. Consequently, a lower tax rate is required to mitigate credit constraints. At the
same time, the borrowing limit is more responsive to labor taxation, because the after
tax income is the more important the higher is the value of °. As a result, the optimal
tax rate decreases much faster than those under exogenous credit constraints.
° = 0:1 ° = 0:2 ° = 0:3 ° = 0:4
t 0:29 (0:30) 0:22 (0:25) 0:18 (0:21) 0:06 (0:16)
v 2:5437 (2:5527) 2:5727(2:5886) 2:6036 (2:6233) 2:6360 (2:6518)
Table 3: optimal tax rates for di®erent values of °
Increasing the value of µ has similar e®ects on the optimal tax rates as increasing the
value of ². The higher is µ, the more important is education and the more the agent would
19like to invest in education. Therefore, when µ is higher, the credit constraints are more
severe and the optimal tax rate is correspondingly higher. As for "; the di®erence between
the optimal tax rates under exogenous and endogenous credit constraints increases with
µ. A higher value of µ implies more distortionary e®ects of credit constraints and thus a
larger negative e®ect of taxation by reducing credit limit.
µ = 0:4 µ = 0:45 µ = 0:5 µ = 0:55
t 0:11 (0:12) 0:18 (0:19) 0:22 (0:25) 0:26 (0:31)
v 2:4959 (2:4988) 2:5309 (2:5381) 2:5727 (2:5886) 2:6234 (2:6531)
Table 3: optimal tax rates for di®erent values of µ
Our simulation results suggest that the optimal tax rate should be set lower when
the e®ect of tax policy on credit constraints is considered. When labor is elastic and
education is important and also when banks can seize a large share of the earnings, we
¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect on the optimal tax policy, when credit constraints are endoge-
nized. Moreover, our simulation shows that, notwithstanding the fact that redistributive
taxation reduces the borrowing limit, taxation with reverse redistribution is not very
probably to be optimal.
5 Conclusion
This paper derives the optimal tax policy when credit constraints arise from the limited
commitment of individuals to repay the loans for educational investment and consump-
tion smoothing. The optimal redistributive taxation balances the total welfare gain of
reducing borrowing demand and of changing the credit limit against the e±ciency costs
of distorting labor supply and education. If a more redistributive taxation tightens (re-
laxes) credit constraints, the optimal tax rate is lower (higher) compared to the case of
exogenous credit constraints. Thus, assuming exogenous credit constraints leads to a too
high (low) tax rate and over- (under) estimates the welfare e®ects of taxation. Numerical
examples show that for reasonable model parameters the optimal tax rate is lower than
that under exogenous credit constraints.
In future research it would be interesting to analyze optimal tax policy with endoge-
nous credit constraints when individuals di®er in ability and in initial wealth. In this
case, the level of borrowing limit at which the individual is indi®erent between defaulting
and repaying would di®er individually and is private information due to the unobservable
ability. Consequently, conditions for equilibrium credit constraints would change, which
would also have di®erent political implications.
20A Appendix
A.1 Second-order-conditions for the households' problem
We ¯rst derive the second-order-conditions for the agent's maximization problem when
it repays the loans. With binding credit constraints, savings are equal to the borrowing
limit a. Hence, we can obtain an unconstrained maximization problem upon substitution




1 + a) + ¯u
¡
(1 ¡ t)w(e)l ¡ (1 + r)a + g
2¢
¡ ¯v (l) (33)
The ¯rst-order-conditions are given by
¡u1 + ¯u2(1 ¡ t)w
0(e)l = 0; (34)
¯u2(1 ¡ t)w(e) ¡ ¯v
0(l) = 0: (35)































where u11 and u22 are the second derivative of the ¯rst and the second period utility
of consumption respectively. For the Hessian matrix to be negative semi-de¯nite, the
principal minors should switch signs. The ¯rst principal minor




2 + ¯u2(1 ¡ t)w
00(e)l (37)
is negative if the utility function of consumption and the wage rate function are concave,
i.e. u11 < 0, u22 < 0 and w00 (e) < 0, which are assumed to be ful¯lled. The second
principal minor should be positive:
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0(e)l + ¯u2(1 ¡ t)w
0(e)
¢2 > 0:





as the elasticity of the marginal disutility v0 (l), µ =
w0(e)e
w(e)
as the elasticity of wage rate and ® =
w00(e)e
w0(e) as the elasticity of the marginal return to
education. Furthermore, de¯ne (1 ¡ t)w(e)l = Z as the net labor income. Using the



















u2 c2 = ¾ as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption u2. ¾ mea-
sures how fast the marginal utility of the second period consumption declines. Further
reformulations of equation (39) lead to
±
¡1 >

















From the concavity of the consumption utility function and of the wage rate function
we have u11 < 0, ® < 0 and ¾ > 0. Therefore, the right-hand-side of (40) is the






µ are in absolute value. Consequently, the second-
order-condition (40) requires that the elasticity ± is not too high, the marginal utility of
consumption decreases su±ciently fast (¾ and u11 are not too small in absolute value)
and the productivity of education is not too high (the elasticity µ is su±ciently small
and the marginal return to education decreases fast enough). These conditions ensure
that the positive feedback between education and labor supply dampens and that interior





1 + a) + ¯u
¡
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ t)w(e)l ¡ F + g
2¢
¡ ¯v (l) (41)
for the case that (1 + r)a > ° (1 ¡ t)w(e)l. Thus, the second-order-conditions are
the same as for the repaying agent except that the after-tax income becomes Z =
(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ t)w(e)l, which does not change the results qualitatively.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We prove in this appendix that in equilibrium the agent who plans to default invests less
in education and work less than the agent who plans to repay. First we establish that
the equilibrium credit limit A is characterized by the following inequations:
° (1 ¡ t)w(e
¤)l
¤ + F > (1 + r)A, (42)




d + F < (1 + r)A, (43)
where (e¤, l¤) are the optimal choices of the agent who plans to repay and (e¤
d, l¤
d) are
the optimal choices of the agent who plans to default. We denote the indirect utilities for
the repaying agent and for the defaulting one as V and Vd respectively. In equilibrium
we have V = Vd. The ¯rst inequation (42) can be shown as follows: Suppose that
22° (1 ¡ t)w(e¤)l¤ + F < (1 + r)A, the repaying agent could then achieve a higher utility
than V = Vd by defaulting, since its second period consumption would increase while the
¯rst period consumption and labor supply remain unchanged. This is not possible since
Vd is the highest utility the agent can achieve by defaulting. Let's now look at the case of
° (1 ¡ t)w(e¤)l¤+F = (1 + r)A. If the agent changes its plan and decides to default, its
utility would remain the same as long as it does not change its education and labor supply
choices. However, the choices (e¤;l¤) are not optimal any more for defaulting, since
u1d
¯u2d >
(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)w0 (e¤)l¤ and
v0(l¤)
u2d > (1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)w(e¤). Consequently, the agent can
achieve a higher utility than V = Vd by defaulting and optimizing its choices accordingly.
This contradicts again the fact that V = Vd is the highest utility the defaulting agent
can obtain. Therefore we can conclude that the inequation (42) must be ful¯lled. The
second inequation (43) can be shown analogously: if ° (1 ¡ t)w(e¤
d)l¤
d + F ¸ (1 + r)A,
the defaulting agent can achieve a higher utility than V = Vd by repaying its loan and
optimizing its choices accordingly. This is a contradiction to the fact that V is the highest









Thus the defaulting agent must have a lower gross labor income than the repaying agent.
There are however 3 cases for w(e¤)l¤ > w(e¤
d)l¤
d: 1) e¤ > e¤
d and l¤ > l¤
d 2) e¤ · e¤
d and
l¤ > l¤
d 3)e¤ > e¤
d and l¤ · l¤
d. Now we show that only the ¯rst case is possible. Dividing
the ¯rst-order-condition for education by the ¯rst-order-condition for labor supply we


















When e¤ · e¤
d and l¤ > l¤













(44) and (45) cannot be ful¯lled simultaneously. Analogously, if e¤ > e¤














d) . Again, for this case (44) and (45) cannot
be ful¯lled simultaneously. Therefore, we can conclude that in equilibrium e¤ > e¤
d and
l¤ > l¤
d. It follows straightforward that the defaulting agent consumes more in the ¯rst
period c1 < c1
d. Since V = Vd in equilibrium, the repaying agent consumes more in the
second period, c2 > c2
d.
23A.3 Slutsky equations
To derive the Slutsky equations we calculate how much lump-sum income g given in
both periods an individual should receive (pay) in order to keep its utility constant
when the tax rate t changes. This is equivalent to deriving the expenditure function
and applying Shephard's lemma. Totally di®erentiating the utility function (1) and the






1 = ¡de + dg + da, (47)
dc
2 = (1 ¡ t)w
0 (e)lde + (1 ¡ t)w(e)dl ¡ w(e)ldt ¡ (1 + r)da + dg. (48)
Substitute dc1 and dc2 in dU to get
dU = (¯u2(1 ¡ t)w
0 (e)l ¡ u1)de + u1dg + (u1 ¡ ¯u2(1 + r))da (49)
+ ¯ (u2(1 ¡ t)w(e) ¡ v
0 (l))dl ¡ ¯u2w(e)ldt + ¯u2dg
= 0.
(¯u2(1 ¡ t)w0 (e)l ¡ u1)de and ¯ (u2(1 ¡ t)w(e) ¡ v0 (l))dl are both equal to zero from
the ¯rst-order-conditions (6) and (7). The term (u1 ¡ ¯u2(1 + r))da is equal to zero as
well since with binding credit constraints da = 0. Thus, we have
dU = ¡¯u2w(e)ldt + (u1 + ¯u2)dg = 0. (50)






























where ec and lc denote the compensated demand function for education and the compen-
sated labor supply function respectively.
A.4 Optimal tax policy with uniform lump-sum transfers
In this appendix we derive the optimal tax policy when government has no access to
age-speci¯c lump-sum transfers, which implies g1 = g2 ´ g. The lagrangian function for
24governmental maximization problem becomes
L =V + ´ (tw(e)l ¡ (2 + r)g), (53)





























































Note that for the constrained agent a = A and e = e(t;g;A). Assuming that credit
constraints remain binding in the neighborhood of policy parameters, we use general
envelope theorem to get
@V
@g
= u1 + ¯u2 + ¹
@A
@g






= ¡¯u2w(e)l + ¹
@A
@t




where ¹ is the marginal utility of an increase in borrowing limit by one unit and is equal
to u1 ¡ (1 + r)¯u2. We de¯ne
Ã ´










as the net social marginal valuation of one unit increase in credit limit measured in terms
of tax revenue, including the income e®ect. Using (56) and (58), we can rewrite the













= 2 + r. (59)
The optimal lump-sum transfer requires that the net social marginal valuation of income
should be equal to its resource costs 2+r, whereby the e®ect of income on the borrowing
limit is taken into account. Using (57), the Slutsky equations (51) and (52), the de¯nition





















25where we de¯ne the elasticity of wage rate in education as µ ´
w0(e)e
w(e) and the tax elasticities
of education and labor supply as "e ´ ¡@ec
@t
1¡t
e and "l ´ ¡@lc
@t
1¡t
l respectively. Using the
de¯nitions ¼ ´ 1 ¡ (1 + r)
¯u2
u1 and ½ ´ 1¡¼
2+r¡¼ we derive the following equation for the
optimal tax rate














(µ"e + "l), (61)
where z ´ w(e)l is the gross labor income. The optimal tax rate balances the welfare
gain of alleviating credit constraints, including the welfare e®ect of induced changes in
the borrowing limit, against the e±ciency costs of distorting educational investment and
labor supply.
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